

Message Text

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O R 031640Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6391
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 03890

E.O. 11652: XGDS 1
TAGS: PGOV, BQG
SUBJECT: FRG PROPOSES STIFF REPLY TO SOVIET DEMARCHES
ON BERLIN

REFS: (A) 77 USBER 3034; (B) USBER 96; (C) USBER 159;
(D) USBER 82; (E) 77 USBER 3126;
(F) 71 BONN A-879; (G) 74 BONN 1875;
(H) 74 MOSCOW 46; (I) 74 STATE 19287;
(J) 74 STATE 37776; (K) 74 STATE 83368

SUMMARY: IN BONN GROUP CONSIDERATION OF THE TEXT OF A
REPLY TO A SOVIET PROTEST IN BERLIN, THE FRG BONN GROUP
REP (VON BRAUNMUEHL) HAS PRESSED THE ALLIES TO INCLUDE
IN THE REPLY THE STATEMENT (TAKEN FROM THE ALLIED
COMMENTARY ON THE QA) THAT WHAT IS NOT PROHIBITED
BY THE QA IS PERMITTED. HE ARGUED THAT ALTHOUGH THE
SOVIET PROTEST DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MAKE THE CONTRARY
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ASSERTION, THE SOVIETS DO SO WITH FREQUENCY ON OTHER
OCCASIONS (AS ABRASIMOV DID IN HIS RECENT CONVERSATION
WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR BRUNET). THE MAIN FOREIGN OFFICE
INTEREST (AND WE DO NOT KNOW HOW HIGH THIS MATTER HAS
GONE) SEEMS TO BE IN HAVING A STIFF ALLIED REPLY WHICH
CAN THEN BE SHOWN TO OTHER FRG MINISTRIES (AND PERHAPS
EVEN OPPOSITION POLITICIANS), WHEN THE ALLIES URGE

RESTRAINT IN FRG ACTIONS IN BERLIN, AS EVIDENCE THAT THE ALLIES ARE BEING PRUDENT BUT HAVE NOT SLACKENED IN THEIR RESOLVE TO STAND UP TO THE SOVIETS OVER BERLIN.

ALLIED RELUCTANCE IN THE BONN GROUP TO ACCEPT THE FRG PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN DISSUADING THE GERMANS FROM PRESSING THE SUBJECT AND WE HAVE BEEN TOLD PRIVATELY BY VON BRAUNMUEHL THAT EVEN IF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DO NOT AGREE TO THE REQUEST, IT WILL BE SUFFICIENT IF THE US DOES. THE UK BONN GROUP REP IS NOW ATTEMPTING A REDRAFT OF THE DRAFT REPLY, WHICH WOULD REJECT THE "IMPLICATION" THAT THAT WHICH IS NOT EXPRESSLY PERMITTED IS PROHIBITED. IT APPEARS TO US THAT THIS IS A MORE ACCEPTABLE FORM BUT THE DANGER EXISTS THAT IT COULD RETURN TO HAUNT US.

THE SUBJECT HAS A LONG HISTORY AND IN 1974 THE FRENCH AND BRITISH DISAVOWED THE THESIS THAT WHAT IS NOT PROHIBITED IS PERMITTED, TERMING IT A US GLOSS ON THE QA. IF, HOWEVER, THE BRITISH ARE ABLE TO DRAFT A COMPROMISE FORMULA ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE, AND IF THIS WILL SATISFY THE FRG, WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD SUPPORT IT. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE AS TO THE POSITION THE US REP SHOULD TAKE IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE IN THE BONN GROUP. END SUMMARY

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1. AT THE JANUARY 31 BONN GROUP MEETING, THE FRG REP (VON BRAUNMUEHL) INTRODUCED A PROPOSED FRG DRAFT OF AN ALLIED ANSWER TO THE STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET FIRST SECRETARY TYUTYUNOV ON NOVEMBER 29, 1977 (REF A), JANUARY 11, 1978 (REF B) AND JANUARY 17, 1977 (REF C, THE UK EMBASSY HERE BELIEVES THAT THE CORRECT DATE IS JANUARY 18, CAN USBER CONFIRM?). THE UK BONN GROUP REP (EYERS) HAD EARLIER INTRODUCED THE MISSIONS' DRAFT (REF D) AS WELL AS A DRAFT OF HIS OWN.

2. THE FRG DRAFT, COPIES OF WHICH HAVE BEEN POUCHED TO EUR/CE AND USBER, CONTAINED INTER ALIA THE STATEMENT THAT "CONTRARY TO YOUR CONTENTION, THE PRINCIPLE THAT THAT WHICH IS NOT PROHIBITED IS PERMITTED WAS ACCEPTED BY THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES AS AN UNDERLYING BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT." VON BRAUNMUEHL NOTED THAT THE SECOND CLAUSE OF THIS SENTENCE WAS TAKEN VERBATIM FROM THE ALLIED TRIPARTITE COMMENTARY ON THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT (PARAGRAPH 105). THERE FOLLOWED A LONG DISCUSSION, DURING WHICH THE ALLIED REPS EXPRESSED GREAT RELUCTANCE

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TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL (TYUTYUNOV DID NOT MAKE THE
ALLEGED CONTENTION IN HIS STATEMENT) AND THE US REP
SUGGESTED THAT A DETAILED REJECTION OF TYUTYUNOV'S
STATEMENT MIGHT ACHIEVE THE SAME PURPOSE, PERHAPS BY
CITING SOME OF THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY.

3. THE US REP SUBMITTED TO THE BONN GROUP A DRAFT REPLY
ON MARCH 1, 1978. IN RESPONSE, EYERS SAID THAT WHILE
THE DRAFT WAS WELL-RESEARCHED AND THOROUGH, AND ALTHOUGH
THERE WAS NO INDIVIDUAL POINT WITH WHICH HE COULD
SERIOUSLY DISAGREE, HE THOUGH THE LENGTH WAS EXCESSIVE.
FRENCH REP (RICHARD) SAID THAT HE SHARED EYERS' VIEW.
WHILE WHAT TYUTYUNOV SAID WAS POLEMICAL AND
MENTIONED A NUMBER OF POINTS, HE QUESTIONED WHETHER IT
WAS NECESSARY TO REFUTE HIM IN SUCH DETAIL.

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4. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED IT A GOOD DRAFT. HOWEVER, HE RECALLED HIS REMARKS AT THE JANUARY 31 BONN GROUP MEETING AND NOTED THAT HE HAD OFFERED A SHORTER DRAFT. HE ALSO WISHED TO REPEAT HIS REASONING AT THE TIME HE INTRODUCED THAT DRAFT. THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A LEGAL POSITION REGARDING BERLIN. THEIRS, NOT THE FRG'S, IS THE CAMPAIGN OF PROVOCATION. HE SAID THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT ONLY REPLY TO SOVIET COMPLAINTS BUT THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO TURN THIS AROUND AND TO SHOW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVOCATIONS. WHEN MET WITH FIRMNESS, THE SOVIETS BACK OFF. THE SOVIET VIEW THAT THAT WHICH IS NOT EXPRESSLY PERMITTED IN THE QA IS PROHIBITED SHOULD BE REJECTED. HE SAID THAT THERE IS CONCERN IN THE FRG, ESPECIALLY IN OTHER MINISTRIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IN THE PUBLIC EYE, THAT THE WESTERN POSITION IN BERLIN IS BEING WHITTLED DOWN. HE ADDED THE PERSONAL REMARK THAT IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A MORE ENERGETIC REJECTION OF A SOVIET PROTEST, IT WILL BE EASIER FOR THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PREVAIL ON OTHER MINISTRIES WHEN THE ALLIES URGE RESTRAINT. THE FOREIGN OFFICE CAN POINT TO THE RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROTEST AS EVIDENCE THAT THE ALLIES ARE NOT WEAKENING THEIR POSITION ON BERLIN IN SPITE OF THEIR VIEW THAT SOME FRG ACTION OR OTHER IN CONNECTION WITH BERLIN IS INAPPROPRIATE.

5. THE US REP RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE DETAILED RESPONSE TO THE TYUTYUNOV DEMARCHES WAS TO SEEK TO MEET THE FRG REQUEST THAT WE BE MORE ENERGETIC IN THE REJECTION OF SOVIET PROTESTS WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY STATING, AS VON BRAUNMUEHL HAD SUGGESTED, THAT WHAT IS NOT PROHIBITED IS PERMITTED. NOTING THE RECENT SOVIET PUBLICATION OF EXCHANGES ON BERLIN, HE SAID THAT

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ANOTHER PURPOSE TO BE SERVED BY REPLYING IN DETAIL IS TO PUT OUR OWN POSITION ON THE RECORD. HE SAID THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THE RELUCTANCE (SHARED WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH) TO INCLUDE THIS SPECIFIC FRG SUGGESTION.

6. FIRST OF ALL, THE SOVIETS DID NOT RAISE THE ARGUMENT; THEREFORE WE WOULD BE REACHING OUT TO REJECT SOMETHING THEY HAD NOT RAISED FORMALLY IN THE STATEMENT TO WHICH WE ARE REPLYING. SECOND, IT WOULD BE A TIME-CONSUMING PROCESS TO SEEK TO REACH BONN GROUP AGREEMENT ON A TEXT, TIME WHICH COULD PRESUMABLY BE SPENT ON MORE IMPORTANT MATTERS, AND IN ANY CASE IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN CAPITALS' APPROVAL OF SUCH A TEXT. THIRD, IF WE ARE

CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARING A CASE FOR CONSULTATIONS, AS THE FRG HAS SUGGESTED, TO CHALLENGE THE SOVIETS ON A BASIC DIFFERENCE OF INTERPRETATION OF THE QA (WHEN THEY HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION IN A DEMARCHE TO THE ALLIES) WOULD ONLY GIVE THEM A PRETEXT FOR DOING SO. IT WOULD BE QUITE ANOTHER QUESTION IF THE SOVIETS HAD MADE THE ASSERTION THAT WHAT IS NOT EXPRESSLY PERMITTED BY THE QA IS PROHIBITED AND WE WOULD PRESUMABLY REJECT THAT ASSERTION. FINALLY, THIS SUBJECT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH IN THE 1974 DISCUSSIONS OF A PROPOSED MEETING IN BERLIN OF THE BUNDESTAG PRESIDUM AND COUNCIL OF ELDERS. ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE HAD NOT COMPLETELY RESEARCHED THE FILE, IT APPEARED THE SAME SUGGESTION WAS NOT ACCEPTED AT THAT TIME (COMMENT: WILHELM LUECKING, WHO WAS VON BRAUNMUEHL'S IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR UNTIL RECENTLY AND WHO IS NOW DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY EQUIVALENT AND IN CHARGE OF THE SOVIET/EAST EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, ECENTLY REFERRED US TO THIS HISTORY. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT LUECKING DOES NOT SHARE VON BRAUNMUEHL'S DESIRE TO

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PRESS THE MATTER ALTHOUGH VON BRAUNMUEHL TELLS US THAT LUECKING HAS NOT TALKED TO HIM ABOUT IT. END COMMENT).

7. VON BRAUNMUEHL REFERRED TO THE SENTENCE IN THE TRIPARTITE COMMENTARY AND EYERS ASKED THAT HE READ THE SUCCEEDING SENTENCE, WHICH READS "ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES REPEATEDLY MADE THIS POINT TO SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES AND ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT EXPLICITLY ACCEPTED BY THEM IT WAS ALSO NOT CONTRADICTED." VON BRAUNMUEHL REJOINED THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT CONTRADICT IT.

8. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT THE SOVIETS OFTEN MAKE THE CLAIM THAT THAT WHICH IS NOT PERMITTED IS PROHIBITED. ABRASIMOV DID SO, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE RECENT LUNCHEON WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR BRUNET (REF E). THIS WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY REJECTED IN THE FRENCH ACCOUNT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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CONVERSATION, ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH HAVE SINCE ASSURED US THAT IT WAS. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THOSE FEDERAL OFFICIALS WHO SAW THE ABRASIMOV STATEMENT DID NOT SEE THE REJECTION. VON BRAUNMUEHL ASKED WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD HAVE A MONOPOLY OF PUTTING THEIR POSITION ON THE RECORD.

9. THE US REP NOTED THAT VON BRAUNMUEHL'S ARGUMENT WAS IN PART GROUNDED ON THE NEED TO HAVE A RECORD TO SHOW FRG OFFICIALS. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THE FRENCH COULD RECORD THE FACT THAT BRUNET REJECTED ABRASIMOV'S CONTENTION AND IF THE SAME FRG OFFICIALS WHO SAW THE ORIGINAL ACCOUNT OF THE BRUNET/ABRASIMOV CONVERSATION COULD BE SHOWN THIS ALSO.

10. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT THIS WAS A COMMON THREAD IN SOVIET REMARKS, TO WHICH EYERS REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A COMMON THREAD OF ALLIED REJECTION.

11. RICHARD SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT ENGAGE IN A POLEMICAL DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS AND THAT THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SHARPENING THEIR POSITION ON BERLIN, ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH DO NOT DENY THAT THIS

MIGHT BE THE CASE.

12. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT INSIST ON THE FRG-PROPOSED REPLY BUT THAT THE FRG WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN ALLIED REJECTION OF THE SOVIET THESIS, EVEN INFORMALLY. EYERS SAID THAT SINCE HIS AMBASSADOR WAS THE NEXT IN LINE TO SEE ABRASIMOV, HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RECOMMEND THAT HIS AMBASSADOR SAY THAT WHAT IS NOT PERMITTED BY THE QA IS PROHIBITED APPEARS TO BE A THREAD WHICH RUNS THROUGH SOVIET STATEMENTS, AND TO CONCLUDE BY SAYING THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THESIS. CONFIDENTIAL

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VON BRAUNMUEHL ASKED WHY THE ALLIES WERE RELUCTANT TO MAKE THIS STATEMENT IN THEIR REPLY. IF THEY DID, HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THEY WOULD PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM PRINTING A SECOND EDITION OF THE RECORD OF PRO-TESTS.

13. APPARENTLY DROPPING THE IDEA OF ASKING HIS AMBASSADOR TO RAISE THE MATTER, EYERS THEN SUGGESTED THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT A REDRAFT OF THE US DRAFT BY SHORTENING IT AND REJECTING THE "IMPLICATION" THAT WHAT WAS NOT EXPRESSLY PERMITTED IS FORBIDDEN. VON BRAUNMUEHL EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THIS OFFER.

14. COMMENT: THE "NOT PROHIBITED/PERMITTED" THESIS HAS A LONG HISTORY, SOME OF WHICH WE FOUND SUBSEQUENT TO THE BONN GROUP MEETING. ALTHOUGH IT IS IN THE TRIPARTITE COMMENTARY (HAVING ITS ORIGIN IN THE AMERICAN VERSION (REF F) AND THAT VERSION DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SECOND SENTENCE REFERRED TO BY EYERS IN PARAGRAPH 7 SUPRA), A DISCUSSION OF THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE PROBLEM BY THE ALLIED AMBASSADORS IN FEBRUARY, 1974 REVEALED THAT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DID NOT ACCEPT THE THESIS, CLAIMING IT TO BE "AN UNWARRANTED AMERICAN GLOSS." THEY PREFERRED INSTEAD TO THINK IN TERMS OF AN UNDEFINED GRAY AREA BETWEEN WHAT IS CLEARLY PROHIBITED AND WHAT IS CLEARLY PERMISSIBLE. (REF G)

15. THE QUESTION ALSO AROSE IN THE 1974 BONN GROUP PREPARATION OF A REPLY TO THE SOVIET PROTEST ON THE PROPOSED MEETING IN BERLIN OF THE PRESIDUM AND COUNCIL OF ELDERS OF THE BUNDESTAG. IN THAT PROTEST, THE SOVIETS STATED THAT THE QA "DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF SESSIONS IN WEST BERLIN" OF THOSE BODIES (REF H). THE US, IN THE BONN GROUP, PROPOSED THAT THE SOVIET

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IMPLICATION SHOULD BE REJECTED AND THE DEPARTMENT SAID,
"IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN POWERS MUST ADHERE
CLOSELY TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT THEY DEVELOPED AND
EXPOUNDED MANY TIMES DURING THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS,
NAMELY THAT WHAT IS NOT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED IN THE
QUADRIpartite AGREEMENT IS PERMISSIBLE. STRESS WILL
CERTAINLY HAVE TO BE PUT ON THIS PRINCIPLE IN THE FORMAL
ANSWER OF THE THREE POWERS GIVEN THE SOVIETS' ORAL
PROTEST OF JANUARY 2. (REF I) MONTHS OF DRAFTING A
REPLY FOLLOWED (ALTHOUGH LACK OF AGREEMENT ON THE
PROHIBITED/PERMITTED STATEMENT ITSELF DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE BEEN THE ONLY CAUSE), AND THE BRITISH CHARGE IN
WASHINGTON EXPRESSED THE FCO'S POSITION THAT THE UK
DOES NOT SHARE THE VIEW THAT ANYTHING NOT SPECIFICALLY
FORBIDDEN IN THE QA IS AUTOMATICALLY PERMITTED (REF J).
IN THE END, HOWEVER, THE REPLY TO THE SOVIETS CONTAINED

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THE PHRASE THAT THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES REJECT
"INTER ALIA THE IMPLICATION IN YOUR STATEMENT THAT
BECAUSE MEETINGS OF THE PRESIDUM AND COUNCIL OF ELDERS
IN THE WSB ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE QA
OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1971, THESE BODIES ARE PRECLUDED FROM
HOLDING MEETINGS THERE." (REF K)

16. IT APPEARS THAT VON BRAUNMUEHL'S INSISTENCE THAT
THE ALLIES INCLUDE A "HARD" STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES
HE SUGGESTS IS MOTIVATED NOT SO MUCH BY A DESIRE TO
ANSWER THE SOVIETS BUT TO HAVE SOMETHING WHICH THE
FOREIGN OFFICE CAN USE INTERNALLY IN THE FRG TO REASSURE
OTHER MINISTRIES (AND PERHAPS SOME POLITICIANS) THAT
THE ALLIES ARE NOT WEAKENING THEIR STAND ON BERLIN.
WHILE THERE IS A CERTAIN LACK OF LOGIC IN LAYING MORE
WEIGHT ON AN ALLIED STATEMENT MADE TO A SOVIET FIRST
SECRETARY IN BERLIN THAN TO THE OTHER CONTINUING DEMON-
STRATIONS OF ALLIED RESOLVE IN MORE CONCRETE TERMS,
INCLUDING THE FACT THAT WE DO NOT NORMALLY OBJECT TO THE
VARIOUS LAENDER AND FRG MEETINGS AND ACTIVITIES IN
BERLIN, WE CAN ONLY ATTRIBUTE THIS TO WHAT SEEMS TO BE
ON OCCASION A TENDENCY IN THE GERMAN BUREAUCRACY TO
BECOME PREOCCUPIED WITH LEGAL POSITIONS.
ON THE ONE HAND, WE SEE LITTLE TO BE GAINED BY
RESPONDING IN THIS FASHION TO THE SOVIETS. THE DANGER
ALSO EXISTS THAT SUCH A STATEMENT COULD RETURN TO
HAUNT US IN THE FUTURE WITH THE GERMANS CLAIMING (IF WE
RAISED A QUESTION ABOUT THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNENESS IN
BERLIN OF SOME EVENT OR ACTIVITY) THAT WE SHOULD BACK UP
OUR POSITION IN THE TRIPARTITE COMMENTARY AND THE REPLY
TO TYUTYUNOV'S DEMARCHES BY RAISING NO OBJECTION. ON
THE OTHER HAND, THE COOPERATION WE HAVE ENJOYED FROM THE
FOREIGN OFFICE SINCE VON BRAUNMUEHL JOINED THE BONN
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GROUP IS EXCELLENT AND, IF THERE IS AN ACCEPTABLE WAY
TO INCLUDE A REJECTION OF THE SOVIET IMPLICATION THAT
THAT WHICH THE QA DOES NOT EXPRESSLY PERMIT IS PRO-
HIBITED, WE CAN ONLY ACCEPT HIS ARGUMENT THAT THIS
MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

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17. VON BRAUNMUEHL TOLD THE US BONN GROUP REP PRIVATELY ON JANUARY 31 THAT WHILE AN ALLIED REPLY TO THE SOVIETS CONTAINING THE DESIRED PHRASE WOULD BE THE IDEAL, THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS THAT SUCH A REPLY BE APPROVED BY THE US. EVEN IF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, IN DESCRIBING ITS EFFORTS AT OBTAINING SUCH A REPLY, CAN SAY THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH IT, THE BRITISH WAFFLED AND THE FRENCH REFUSED, THE EXERCISE WILL SERVE MUCH OF THE SAME PURPOSE. HE REPEATED THIS STATEMENT TO THE US REP ON FEBRUARY 28. BECAUSE OF THE APPARENT IMPORTANCE OF THIS MATTER TO VON BRAUNMUEHL (WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH HIGHER IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE IT HAS GONE), WE ARE RELUCTANT TO PROCEED MUCH FURTHER IN THE BONN GROUP WITHOUT THE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IN THIS CASE FOR US TO AGREE AD REF
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TO SOMETHING IN THE BONN GROUP AND HAVE THE DEPARTMENT

REJECT IT. FOR THE REASONS CITED ABOVE, IT APPEARS TO US THAT IF THE BRITISH DRAFT A STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF "WE REJECT THE IMPLICATION THAT MERELY BECAUSE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT EXPRESSLY PERMITTED BY THE QA THEY ARE PROHIBITED," WE SHOULD SUPPORT IT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT WE SHOULD SUPPORT A POSITIVE STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY VON BRAUNMUEHL.

18. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE.
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SAS ID: 3134034
Secure: OPEN
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